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Abstract
We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two
orthogonal issues, where candidates are oﬃce motivated and committed to
a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom
to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two
settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the
same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed
to a diﬀerent dimension. We characterise and give necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distri-
butions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point in
the ideology space which we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly
related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our
analysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or diﬀerentiation)
seems to be an important equilibrium feature.
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The seminal Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957))
of electoral competition and its well known result of policy convergence to
the median voter have remained central to the literature on formal politi-
cal economics. The crucial assumption of this model is that candidates care
only about winning the elections and are able to commit to any pre-election
announcement of policies (c.f. Duggan (2005)). This assumption leads to
problems with existence of Nash equilibria even with two competing politi-
cians in multi-dimensional ideology spaces. A multi-dimensional generaliza-
tion of the median voter theorem states that a Nash equilibrium choice of
policies with two competing candidates must be the point which is weakly
majority preferred by all voters (a core point) (Duggan (2005)). The formal
requirements for the existence of such a point in multi-dimensional ideology
spaces is so restrictive (Plott (1967)) that for almost all speciﬁcations of voter
preferences, the core point does not exist.1
In this paper we study the Hotelling-Downs setting with two competing
1Duggan and Jackson (2005) attempt to overcome this problem by studying a model
with mixed strategies of candidates and assuming that candidates are unable to predict
each others policy positions. It is shown that if indiﬀerent voters are allowed to randomize
with any probability ability between zero and one (instead of voting for each candidate with
equal probability), then it is possible to have existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
2candidates on a two-dimensional ideology space where the set of policies
each candidate can propose is restricted by his commitment to one of the
issues/dimensions. We take the stand that while a candidate’s pre-electoral
position may have more than one orthogonal issues, a candidate may not
be able to make credible commitments on all of these issues due to history
or his own identity. For example, while L. K. Advani (the right-wing BJP
leader) of India can credibly commit to a large extent to any position on
issues such as budget deﬁcits, voters in India will never believe that he could
take an anti-Hindu stand if voted to power. Similarly, it would be hard
for Barack Obama to credibly commit to any policy that can directly hurt
African Americans. Also, a candidate may represent a particular political
party, which by history has adopted a certain stance towards some of the
issues which cannot be relaxed by the candidate (that is the current leader).
Similar phenomenon may occur when new issues are introduced during the
political campaign (e.g. see Hinich and Munger (2008)). Appearance of new
issue might give a candidate a new degree of freedom in selecting his political
position, while he has to ‘stick’ his position towards the older ones. In other
words, by virtue of popularity, a candidate (or a political party) is at times
identiﬁed by ideologies in certain issues on which they establish irrefutable
reputation, while such a label does not appear for them in other issues.
We also take the stand that in a mature democracy with well-established
leaders and parties, it is almost inevitable that each party or leader faces
such reputations. Our framework is a simpliﬁcation of this stand and results
in each candidate having to choose a policy from a unidimensional ideology
space to win the election which is otherwise contested in a 2-dimensional
3ideology space. Additionally we allow each candidate to stay out of the
elections, if winning is impossible for him. We restrict our attention to pure
strategies only and we are interested in the existence of Nash equilibria where
both candidates contest. Our focus is to address this in situations where the
core is empty, and where in equilibrium the two parties take very diﬀerent
stands.
The idea of restricting ideology spaces of candidates is new. A similar idea
is studied very recently by Beeler Asay (2008) where ‘feasible’ policies of can-
didates are restricted by linear constraints in a setting with two-dimensional
ideology space, a ﬁnite set of voters and two oﬃce-motivated candidates.
The central objective of that study is this: given that an incumbent faces
competition from a potential entrant, what policy must he choose to mini-
mize the probability of his opponent’s victory. New solution concepts called
a constrained strong point and a constrained core are developed to add to
the stream of literature in political competition where new solution concepts
are sought to overcome the problem of emptiness of the core (c.f. Ferejohn
et al. (1984), Owen and Shapley (1989), Wuﬄe et al. (1989)). Since our focus
is on sustaining equilibria where both parties contest and there is no gain
from votes unless it leads to victory with positive probability, the notions of
the strong point or the constrained strong point are not helpful. We identify
another ‘special’ point in the ideology space that has strict relation (that is
either they both exist or they both do not) with the notion of the constrained
core and in high dimensions plays the role of a ‘median voter’. We call this
point the strict median and we show that this point is the projection of the
constrained cores (which we show, if it exists, is always unique with a con-
4tinuum of voters) of each candidate in their respective feasible strategy sets.
Our analysis suggests that in electoral games with two competing candidates
and with restricted strategies, either the core is non-empty in which case the
core coincides with the strict median and an equilibrium with both candi-
dates contesting exists, or that the core is empty while the strict median may
still exist and the existence of the strict median is necessary for existence of
equilibrium in pure strategies where both candidates contest. The more inter-
esting scenario for us is where the two contesting parties announce diﬀerent
platforms. We show that in every such equilibrium, the parties must be far
apart from each other. In particular when they share a common committed
issue, the parties must hold strongly extremist and opposite positions in that
issue while their announced policy converges in the other issue in which they
are free to choose. In the case where the committed issues of the two parties
are diﬀerent, their overall positions must remain signiﬁcantly distant from
each other.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. We introduce the model
formally in Section 2. Then we provide some preliminary notions and results
in Section 3 and the main results in Section 4 and comment on one-party
equilibrium. We discuss our ﬁndings and the notion of the strict median in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. The Model
Two candidates 1 and 2 compete for oﬃce in an election governed by the
majority rule. There is a continuum of voters, denoted by the set C and
each voter in C has a single-peaked preference over the set of policy positions,
5which is assumed to be the real plane R2 (that is each policy consists of two
independent (orthogonal) issues, the set of issues is denoted by I = {1,2}).
We shall use δ to denote the Euclidean distance on R2. The ideal policies of
the voters are distributed on R2 with a distribution function given by density
function f (throughout the text we will identify the respective distribution
with f as well). We assume that f is non-atomic, that is the support X of
f is such that there exists a connected open set Z ⊆ X such that X ⊆ ¯ Z,
where ¯ Z denotes the closure of Z.2
Each of the candidates d ∈ {1,2} is committed to a particular value
of only one of the issues, while he has freedom of credible choice of his
political position over the remaining one. The committed issue of candidate
d is denoted by cd ∈ I and the free issue is denoted by nd. The unique ideal
value of the committed issue of candidate d is denoted by vd. We will also use
a (instead of v1) to denote this ideal value of candidate 1 and use b (instead
of v2) for candidate 2. Points a and b are common knowledge amongst all
players so that these are the only credible pre-electoral announcements for
the committed issues. However each candidate d ∈ {1,2} is free to choose
his policy from his feasible set of policies Ld = {¯ x ∈ R2 : ¯ x ↓ cd = vd}, which
is a line in R2. Thus, each candidate is committed to one of the issues and
to announce his proposed policy ¯ xd ∈ R2, candidate d has to choose a value
of the issue nd.
Elections are conducted as follows: each candidate makes a decision (si-
multaneously and independently) of whether (or not) to contest the elections
2We see this as a natural generalization of the notion of non-atomicity of unidimensional
distributions.
6and, if he decides to contest, what policy to propose. These announcements
become common knowledge amongst voters and all voters cast votes, voting
for their most preferred policies (in case of a tie, they vote for each candi-
date with equal probability). A candidate who receives the maximal mass of
support is selected as the winner of the elections (while a tie is broken by an
equiprobable draw). The winner implements the policy he announced. We
assume the following preferences of candidates: they prefer (a) not contesting
to losing ; (b) a tie to not contesting; (c) winning to not contesting; (d) to
be the unique winner to any other outcome; and (e) a tie to losing.
In summary, the strategic game Γ
c1,c2
a,b is studied in which the set of can-
didates is {1,2}, the committed issue of candidate 1 is c1 and his preferred
value of this issue is a and the committed issue of candidate 2 is c2 and his
preferred value of this issue is b. For each candidate d ∈ {1,2} the set of pure
strategies is {N}∪R, where N stays for staying out of the elections, and the
preferences are as described above. In what follows we shall focus our atten-
tion on issues concerning existence and characteristics of pure strategy Nash
equilibria of Γ
c1,c2
a,b where both candidates contest. We call such equilibria
Full-Participation Equilibria.
3. Preliminaries
Before presenting the results we need to deﬁne some notions. Given a





to denote the mass of voters with ideal policies in X.
7Any line l ⊆ R2 gives a rise to a distribution fl, which will be called a





deﬁned for ¯ z ∈ l, where l⊥(¯ z) denotes the line perpendicular to l intersecting
it at ¯ z. Notice that if f is non-atomic, then fl is non-atomic as well.
A line m ⊆ R2 such that the masses of both half planes deﬁned by the
line are equal is called a median line. The following fact is crucial for our
results [see appendix for a proof].
Fact 1. Let f be a non-atomic distribution. Then for any vector ~ v ∈ R2
there exists a unique median line m
f
~ v perpendicular to ~ v.
Given an issue i ∈ I we will use ei to denote the unit vector associated
with the respective dimension of the issue i. Then mei denotes median line
associated with vector ei. We will also use a shorter notation mi to denote
the median line mei.
Given two policies {¯ x1, ¯ x2} ⊆ R2, let B(¯ x1, ¯ x2) = {¯ x ∈ R : δ(¯ x1, ¯ x) =
δ(¯ x2, ¯ x)} be the bisector of ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 (c.f. Aurenhammer and Klein (2000)),
that is a line perpendicular to the interval connecting policies ¯ x1 and ¯ x2,
going through its middle. The bisector of ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 separates the half space
D(¯ x1, ¯ x2) = {¯ x ∈ R2 : d(¯ x1, ¯ x) < d(¯ x2, ¯ x)} containing policies that are closer
to ¯ x1 from the half space D(¯ x2, ¯ x1) containing the policies that are closer to
¯ x2. Then D(¯ x1, ¯ x2) contains ideal points of voters strictly preferring ¯ x1 to
¯ x2.
Similarly, we deﬁne a bisector line of two lines l1 ⊆ R2 and l2 ⊆ R2 to be
8a line consisting of points equidistant from both lines.3 Two lines may have
one (if their intersection is empty) or two (otherwise) bisector lines. The set
of bisector lines of lines l1 and l2 is denoted by B(l1,l2).
We say that ¯ x1 is weakly majority preferred to ¯ x2, denoted by ¯ x1 ¯ M¯ x2, if
µ(D(¯ x1, ¯ x2)) ≥ µ(D(¯ x2, ¯ x1)), that is the mass of support of ¯ x1 is not smaller
than the mass of support of ¯ x2. The set of policies Cf ⊆ R2 that are weakly
majority-preferred to all other policies is called the core policies or simply
the core. The relation of strict majority preference is deﬁned as usual and
will be denoted by M.
Given a distribution f we will use Mf = {m
f
~ v : ~ v ∈ R} to denote the set
of all median lines associated with f. The following fact is well known, but
for completeness we provide its proof in the appendix.
Fact 2. Given a non-atomic distribution function f, the core of Cf 6= ∅
if and only if there exists ¯ cf ∈ R2 such that for any {m1,m2} ∈ Mf, if
m1 6= m2, then the intersection point of them is ¯ cf and Cf = {¯ cf}.
That is the core Cf, if it exists, must consist of (the unique) intersection
point ¯ cf of all median lines. We call ¯ cf the core point and every voter
whose ideal position is ¯ cf is called a core voter. Facts 1 and 2 together
clearly indicate that non-emptiness of the core is hard to achieve in higher
dimensions while its existence is guaranteed in one-dimension (the median).
3By ‘distance’ between a point and a line we mean the standard notion of the shortest
distance between the two.
94. The Results
In our analysis we will be interested in Nash equilibria as strategy proﬁles
in R2, that is in Nash equilibria in which both candidates contest. We call
such equilibria full participation Nash equilibria. Among full participation
Nash equilibria we will also distinguish between two kinds: those where the
policies proposed by the candidates are the same, which we call Convergent
Full Participation Equilibria (CFPE), and those where the policies proposed
by the candidates are diﬀerent, which we call Divergent Full Participation
Equilibria (DFPE). We are mainly interested in the existence and charac-
teristics of a DFPE and particularly so when the core is empty.
In the subsections to follow we study conditions for existence and prop-
erties of a CFPE and a DFPE, analysing two cases separately: one where
both candidates are committed to the same issue (Homogeneous Commit-
ment) and the other where each candidate is committed to a diﬀerent issue
(Heterogeneous Commitment).
4.1. Convergent Full Participation Equilibria
The analysis of a CFPE is quite straightforward and we ﬁrst state our
results in this case.
4.1.1. Homogeneous Commitment
In the case of homogeneous commitment, where the committed issues
of both candidates are the same it either holds that L1 ∩ L2 = ∅, that is
feasible sets of policies of both candidates are disjoint, which is the case
when a 6= b, or it holds that L1 = L2, that is both candidates have the
same feasible set of policies, which is the case when a = b. The necessary
10condition for the existence of a CFPE is that a = b in which case we have the
classical Hotelling-Downsian competition in one dimension and the following
well known result holds (thus left without a proof).
Theorem 1. Consider a game Γ
i,i
a,b. Then a CFPE of Γ
i,i
a,b exists if and only
if a = b. Moreover if (x1,x2) is a CFPE of Γi,i
a,a, then x1 = x2 = m, where
m is the median of the distribution f projected on L = L1 = L2.
4.1.2. Heterogeneous Commitment
In the case of heterogeneous commitment it always holds that L1∩L2 6= ∅
and the intersection of the feasible sets of policies of both candidates contains
exactly one policy. It turns out that a CFPE exists in this case if and only
if L1 and L2 are median lines. We show that the policy proposed by the
two candidates in a CFPE must be this unique intersection point of the two
feasible sets of policies. The central message of the following theorem is that
such equilibrium exists if and only if the feasible sets of strategies of the two
candidates are the two vertical and horizontal median lines and in any such
equilibrium, if a is the value of the committed issue for candidate 1, then it
is also the announced value of the free issue for candidate 2 and vice versa
(with respect to b).
Theorem 2. Consider a game Γ
i,j
a,b with i 6= j. Then a CFPE of Γ
i,j
a,b exists
if and only if L1 = mi and L2 = mj. Moreover, if this condition is satisﬁed
then a strategy proﬁle (y1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if y1 = b and
x2 = a.
Proof. If a strategy proﬁle (y1,x2) is a CFPE then it must be that L1∩L2 =
{(y1,x2)} and so it must be that y1 = b and x2 = a.
11For the left to right implication of the existence part of the theorem we
will show that if (y1,x2) is a CFPE, then it must be that (y1,x2) ∈ mi ∩ mj.
Assume the opposite. Then either (y1,x2) / ∈ mi or (y1,x2) / ∈ mj. Suppose
that the ﬁrst case holds. Let ¯ x ∈ L1∩mj. Then ¯ xM(y1,x2) and so candidate
1 can win outright by proposing ¯ x ↓ j instead of y1. Analogous argument
can be used for the case where (y1,x2) / ∈ mj. Thus if (y1,x2) is a Nash
equilibrium, then it must be that (y1,x2) ∈ mi ∩ mj and so it must be that
L1 = mi and L2 = mj.
For the right to left implication of the existence and characterisation part
of the theorem assume that L1 = mi and L2 = mj and consider a strategy
proﬁle (y1,x2) such that y1 = b and x2 = a. Let ¯ x ∈ L1 ∩ L2 be the policy
proposed by both candidates under this strategy proﬁle. Then for any ¯ x0 ∈ L1
it holds that ¯ xM¯ x0, so it is not proﬁtable for candidate 1 to deviate to any
other position. Similarly, it is not proﬁtable for candidate 2 to deviate to
any other position as well. Hence (y1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus we have provided the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for exis-
tence of a CFPE together with full characterisation of such equilibria in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous commitments.
4.2. Divergent Full Participation Equilibria
Before we study conditions for existence and characteristics of a DFPE in
both homogeneous and heterogeneous commitment settings, let us investigate
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a winning strategy
for one of the candidates given an arbitrary strategy of its competitor.
Let ¯ x2 be the policy proposed by candidate 2 and assume that ¯ x2 / ∈
12L1
x2
Figure 1: Bisector lines from B(¯ x2,L1) and the tangent parabola.
L1, that is the policy ¯ x2 is not feasible for candidate 1. Consider the set
B(¯ x2,L1) = {B(¯ x1, ¯ x2) : ¯ x1 ∈ L1} of bisector lines between ¯ x2 and all feasible
policies of candidate 1. Notice that all the lines in B(¯ x2,L1) are tangent to
the parabola with focus ¯ x2 and directrix L1 (see Figure 1).
Let P(¯ x2,L1) denote the subset of the plane separated by that parabola
together with the parabola and containing policy ¯ x2. Notice that the interior
of region P(¯ x2,L1) could be interpreted as the set of ideal positions of the
electorate which is inaccessible to candidate 1 (that is, loyal voters of candi-
date 2). The following lemma gives the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for candidate 1 to possess a policy that would win over ¯ x2.
Lemma 1. Let ¯ x2 be the policy proposed by candidate 2 and assume that
¯ x2 / ∈ L1. Then there exists ¯ x ∈ L1 such that ¯ xM¯ x2 if and only if there exists
a median line m ∈ Mf such that m ∩ P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅.
Proof. For the right to left implication suppose that m ∈ Mf is a median
13line such that m∩P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅. Let l be a line parallel to m and tangent to
P(¯ x2,L1). Then policy ¯ x which is the reﬂection of ¯ x2 in l strictly dominates
¯ x2 as m ∈ D(¯ x, ¯ x2).
For the left to right implication suppose that there exists ¯ x ∈ L1 such
that ¯ xM¯ x2. Consider the bisector of ¯ x2 and ¯ x, B(¯ x2, ¯ x) (which is tangent to
P(¯ x2,L1)) and let m be the median line parallel to B(¯ x2, ¯ x). Since ¯ xM¯ x2, so
it must be that m ∈ D(¯ x, ¯ x2) and since P(¯ x2,L1)∩D(¯ x, ¯ x2) = ∅, so it must
be that m ∩ P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅.
Lemma 1 provides us with a necessary and suﬃcient condition for exis-
tence of winning best responses for a candidate and shows that they exist if
and only if there exists a median line that does not intersect a parabolic re-
gion associated with one of the policies proposed under the ‘current’ strategy
proﬁle.
Before we proceed to introducing the results on a DFPE, let us introduce
yet another notion that will be crucial. Let m ∈ Mf be a median line and
assume that f is non-atomic. By Fact 1, every median line in Mf can be
uniquely identiﬁed by its gradient r with respect to the median line m (that
is r = tan(α), where α is the angle between m and the median line). We will
use [m]r to denote the median line identiﬁed by m and r ∈ R. The proof of
the following fact is moved to the Appendix.
Consider function γm : R\{0} → m such that {γm(r)} = m∩[m]r. That
is γm(r) returns the intersection point of m and [m]r.
Fact 3. If f is non-atomic, then for any m ∈ Mf, γm is a continuous
function on R \ {0}.
14Finally, Let ¯ p
+
0 (m) = limr→0+ γm(r) and ¯ p
−
0 (m) = limr→0− γm(r).
4.2.1. Homogeneous commitment
Suppose that c1 = c2 = i (and consequently n1 = n2 = j 6= i) and a 6= b.
To simplify the presentation we will assume that for any ¯ x = (x,y) ∈ R, that
the ﬁrst coordinate is the value of the free issue j while the second coordinate
is the value of the committed issue i. We will also use x1 and x0
1 to denote
values of free issue chosen by candidate 1 and x2 and x0
2 to denote values of
the free issue chosen by candidate 2.
It turns out that in any DFPE with homogeneous commitment, both can-
didates have to propose the same value of their free issues. Thus, divergence
here is entirely driven by history of the party. For such an equilibrium to
exist, the distribution f must be such that both ¯ p
+
0 (mi) and ¯ p
−
0 (mi) exist and
¯ p
+
0 (mi) = ¯ p
−
0 (mi) = ¯ p0(mi). However, the interesting aspect of existence is
that the feasible sets of policies of both candidates must be distant enough
from each other and the median line mi must be the bisector of them. This
implies that strong extremism in the committed dimension must prevail, while
these two parties who are known to take two opposing extremist stands in a
common issue must take a common stand in the free issue. The equilib-
rium strategy of each candidate is the projection of ¯ p0(mi) on his feasible set
of policies. Finally, the theorem also indicates that stronger divergence in
the common committed issue cannot reduce the chance of existence of such
equilibria.
Theorem 3. Consider a game Γ
i,i




15(i). B(L1,L2) = {mi},
(ii). ¯ p
+
0 (mi) = ¯ p
−
0 (mi) = ¯ p0(mi) ∈ R2,
(iii). |a − b| ≥ Df, where Df ∈ R≥0 is a threshold value that depends on the
distribution f only,
(iv). for any ε > 0 a DFPE of game Γ
i,i
a+ε,b−ε (if a > b) or game Γ
i,i
a−ε,b+ε (if
a < b) exists.
Moreover, if a DFPE Γ
i,i
a,b exists, then (x1,x2) is a DFPE if and only if
x1 = x2 = ¯ p0(mi) ↓ j.
Proof. We start by showing that if a DFPE of Γ
i,i
a,b exists, then B(L1,L2) =
{mi}. Assume that the opposite holds, that is there exists a DFPE (x1,x2)
and B(L1,L2) 6= {mi}. Notice that since L1 ∩ L2 = ∅, so they have ex-
actly one bisector line. Then it holds that B((x1,a),(x1,b)) 6= mi and
B((x2,a),(x2,b)) 6= mi. Since f is non-atomic, so either µ(D((x2,a),(x2,b))) >
µ(D((x2,b),(x2,a))) (if L1 is closer to mi than L2) or µ(D((x1,b),(x1,a))) >
µ(D((x1,a),(x1,b))) (if L2 is closer to mi than L1). Thus either candi-
date 1 can propose x2 instead of x1 and win outright (in the ﬁrst case)
or candidate 2 can propose x1 instead of x2 and win outright (in the sec-
ond case). Hence (x1,x2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium and it must be that
B((x,a),(x,b)) = mi, for all x ∈ R.
We show next that if (x1,x2) is a DFPE, then it must be that x1 = x2.
Again assume that the opposite holds, that is x1 6= x2. Let ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 denote
the policies proposed by candidates 1 and 2 in equilibrium, respectively. As
we have shown above, it must be that B(L1,L2) = mi. Then P(¯ x1,L2) ∩
P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅ and there exist two diﬀerent parallel lines l1 and l2, one






Figure 2: Conﬁguration with x1 6= x2 and possible improving deviations (at least one of
them improves).
line m parallel to l1 and l2 satisﬁes m∩P(¯ x1,L2) = ∅ or m∩P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅
(see Figure 2).
But then, by Lemma 1, there exists an improving deviation for one of the
candidates and so (x1,x2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Hence it must be
that if (x1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium, then x1 = x2.
Thirdly, we show that if (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium, then it must be
that x = ¯ p
+
0 (mi) ↓ j and x = ¯ p
−
0 (mi) ↓ j. We will show the ﬁrst equality,
the second one can be shown by analogical arguments. Assume the opposite,
that is x 6= x0 where x0 = ¯ p
+
0 (mi) ↓ j. Let ¯ x ∈ mi denote the projection
of policy proposed by candidate 1 in equilibrium on median line mi. Then
¯ x 6= ¯ p
+
0 (mi). Since ¯ p
+
0 (mi) = limr→0+ γmi(r) and, by Fact 3, γmi is continuous
17on R \ {0}, so for any σ > 0 there exists rσ > 0 such that for all r0 ∈ [0,rσ),
|γmi(r0) − γmi(0)| < σ. Take σ = |x − x0|/2 and let l be the line tangent to
P(¯ x2,L1) at projection of point ((a+b)/2,(2x−x0)/2) on P(¯ x2,L1) (if x0 > x)
or the line tangent to P(¯ x1,L2) at projection of point ((a+b)/2,(2x0−x)/2)
on P(¯ x1,L2) (if x0 < x). Let s be the gradient of l with respect to median
line mi. Then there exists r0 ∈ [0,rσ) such that r0 < s. For any such r0
the associated median line [mi]r0 does not intersect P(¯ x2,L1) (if x0 > x) or
P(¯ x1,L2) (if x > x0) (see Figure 3). Hence, by Lemma 1, (x,x) cannot be a
Nash equilibrium of Γ
i,i
a,b, which contradicts our assumptions. Thus it must
be that x = ¯ p
+
0 (mi) ↓ j. It can shown, using analogical arguments, that
if (x,x) is a divergent full participation Nash equilibrium, then it must be
that x = ¯ p
−
0 (mi) ↓ j. It follows that if a divergent full participation Nash
equilibrium of Γ
i,i
a,b exists, then it must be that ¯ p
+
0 (mi) = ¯ p
−
0 (mi).
Before we continue with the proof, we make the following remark.
Remark 1. Notice that the analysis above implies that if a divergent full
participation Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
a,b exists, then it is unique and has
a form (x,x), where x = ¯ p0(mi) ↓ j. Hence if such equilibrium exists, then a
strategy proﬁle (x,x), where x = ¯ p0(mi) ↓ j, must be a Nash equilibrium.
In the next part of the proof we show that if a divergent full participation
Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
a,b exists, then there exists a divergent Nash
equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
a+ε,b−ε (if a > b) or game Γ
i,i
a−ε,b+ε (if a < b), for any
ε > 0.
Suppose that a > b (proof for b < a is analogical) and let (x,x) be a
divergent full participation Nash equilibrium of Γ
i,i
a,b. Let Lε
1 = {(x,a + ε) :
x ∈ R} and Lε









Figure 3: Conﬁguration with x < x0 and a median line lying outside region P(¯ x2,L1).
P((x,a),L2) ⊆ P((x,a + ε),Lε
2) and P((x,b),L1) ⊆ P((x,b + ε),Lε
1). Thus
any median line intersecting both P((x,a),L2) and P((x,b),L1) intersects
both P((x,a + ε)),Lε
2) and P((x,b − ε),Lε
1) as well.
Hence, by Lemma 1, (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
a+ε,b−ε. More-
over, there exists a minimal distance Df ≥ 0 between a and b such that
P((x,a),L2) ∪ P((x,b),L1) intersects all the median lines. Value of Df de-
pends on the distribution f only as x = ¯ p0(mi) ↓ j depends on the distribution
f.
Equilibria with a non-empty core. If the distribution function f has a non-
empty core, then we are able to extend Theorem 3 to provide the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for existence of a DFPE and its full characterisation.
The theorem shows that when the core is non-empty, such an equilibrium
19exists if and only if the two values of the committed issues lie equidistantly
on either side of the median line that is vertical to the committed issue and
that both candidates choose identical policies on their common free issue. In
that sense, there is convergence of policies in the common free issue.
Theorem 4. Consider a game Γ
i,i
a,b with a 6= b. If distribution function
f has non-empty core Cf = {¯ cf}, then a DFPE of Γ
i,i
a,b exists if and only if
B(L1,L2) = mi. Moreover, (x1,x2) is a DFPE if and only if x1 = x2 = ¯ cf ↓ j.
Proof. Notice that if ¯ cf is a core point, then ¯ p
+
0 (mi) = ¯ p
−
0 (mi) = ¯ cf and
Df = 0. Hence necessary conditions for existence of full participation Nash
equilibrium follow immediately from Theorem 3.
Similarly, if (x1,x2) is a divergent full participation Nash equilibrium then
x1 = x2 = ¯ cf ↓ j follows immediately from Theorem 3.
On the other hand we will show that if B(L1,L2) = mi, then a strategy
proﬁle (x,x) such that x = ¯ cf ↓ j is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
a,b. Let ¯ x1
and ¯ x2 denote the policies proposed by candidates 1 and 2, respectively, under
the strategy proﬁle (x,x). Notice that P(¯ x1,L2) and P(¯ x2,L1) intersect all
the median lines. Hence, by Lemma 1, no proﬁtable deviation from (x,x) is
possible by any candidate and so (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium.
Equilibria with an empty core. We are unable to give a full set of conditions
for the existence of a DFPE and provide complete characterisation of such
equilibria if the core of f is empty. However we provide the following exam-
ples with empty core distributions, one where a DFPE exists and another






Figure 4: Distribution function for Example 1.
Example 1 (Existence of a DFPE). Consider the distribution function f
which supports a (closed) square with sides of length 2 as presented in Fig-
ure 4. The square is divided into 8 parts of equal area. The density function
is constant on each of these areas (including the clockwise border, and ex-
cluding the centre) and at the centre its value is the same as in areas labelled
with B. The mass of each area labelled with A is µA and the mass of each
area labelled with B is µB. We assume that µB > µA > 0 and µA+µB = 1/4.
We will also refer to a diﬀerence θ = µB−µA between the two masses (notice
that 0 < θ < 1/4).
Observe that the horizontal median line is the horizontal axis of symmetry
of the square and vertical median line is the vertical axis of symmetry of the
square. Also observe that the core is indeed empty.
Let the coordinate system be orientated so that the horizontal median line
is the horizontal axis (x) and the vertical median line is the vertical axis
(y). Consider a game Γ
i,i
c,−c with committed issue i of both candidates being
horizontal dimension and the values to which candidate 1 and 2 are committed
21being c and −c, respectively. We prove the following claim:
Claim 1. If c ≥ 4θ, then (−2θ,−2θ) is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
c,−c.
Proof. Let x(r) be the distance from the origin to the intersection point
(−x(r),0) of a median line given by the equation y = r(x + x(r)) with the
horizontal median line as a function of the gradient r. We will show some
properties of x(r) that will be useful to prove our claim.
Notice that since the distribution is symmetric about the horizontal axis,
so x(r) = x(−r). Hence we will restrict our attention to the case where
r > 0. Observe that if r > 0, then the intersection point cannot be on the
right hand side of the origin, as the mass on the left hand side of the line
y = rx is larger than the mass on its right hand side. Thus it must be
that x(r) ≥ 0. Moreover, it must be that x(r) < 1 (that is the intersection
point lies within the bounds of the square), since otherwise the mass on the
right hand side of the line would be larger than the mass on the left hand
side of the line. Similarly, if r > 0, then the associated median line cannot
intersect the upper bound of the square to the right of the vertical axis as this
axis it a median line. Hence there are three conﬁguration with median line
intersecting the square possible as depicted in Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
Notice that since x(r) < 1, so for r ∈ (1,1/2) it must be that median line
y = r(x + x(r)) intersects the square according to conﬁguration (1).
We will now compute the value of x(r) for conﬁguration (1). Consider
a line y = r(x + d) intersecting the square according to conﬁguration (1).
To compute the mass on the left hand side of a line y = r(x + d), where
d ∈ [−1,0], we will need to compute the masses of the regions R1, R2, R3,




Figure 5: Conﬁguration (1) with median line y = r(x + x(r)) intersecting the square.


















r((r − 1)(d + 1)2 + d2)
2(r − 1)
.
Now the mass of the left hand side of the line y = r(x + d) is
2µB + 2µA − 2µB(v2(r,d) + v4(r,d)) − 2µA(v3(r,d) + v5(r,d)) + 2µBv1(r,d)
which, after substituting µB − µA by θ is equal to
4r3θd2 + r(r2 − 1)d + (r2 − 1)(2rθ − 1)
2(r2 − 1)
23Making this equal to 1/2 and solving for d we ﬁnd x(r), which is the
intersection point of the median line y = r(x+x(r)) with the horizontal axis
x(r) =
p











0 = (−2θ,0). Moreover, by symmetry of the distribution about horizon-
tal median line, ¯ p
−
0 = ¯ p
+
0 , and so ¯ p0 = (−2θ,0).
We will also show that x(r) is decreasing in r for 0 < r ≤ 1. Diﬀerenti-




(1 − r2)(r2(32θ2 − 1) + 1) + r2(1 − 16θ2) − 1
4r3θ
p
(1 − r2)(r2(32θ2 − 1) + 1)
.
The denominator of x0(r) is > 0 for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and 0 < θ < 1/4 and the
nominator can be rewritten as
256r4θ4
r2(1 − 16θ2) − 1 −
p




















2 + 2 > 0
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and 0 < θ < 1/4, so (3) is < 0 and so x0(r) < 0. Thus x(r) is
decreasing on (0,1] for 0 < θ < 1/4. This means in particular that x(r) < 2θ
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and 0 < θ < 1/4. Consider a line y = r(x + 2θ) and suppose








Figure 6: Conﬁguration (2) with median line y = r(x + x(r)) intersecting the square.
that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1/(1+2θ). Notice that for any 2θ < d ≤ 0, the line y = r(x+d)
intersects the square according to conﬁguration (1) as well. Hence, by the
fact that 2θ < x(r) ≤ 0 for conﬁguration (1) and 0 < θ < 1/4, it holds that
x(r) < 2θ for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1/(1 + 2θ) and 0 < θ < 1/4.
For the remaining two conﬁgurations, we will show that in each of them
it must be that x(r) < 2θ. Consider a line y = r(x + 2θ) and suppose that
it intersects the square according to conﬁguration (2) (see Figure 6). Then
it holds that 1/(1 + 2θ) ≤ r ≤ 1/(1 − 2θ). We will show that the sum of
masses of the regions R2, R3, R0
4 and R0
5 is greater than the mass of region
R1, which implies that the median line y = r(x + x(r)) must be to the right
of the line y = r(x + 2θ), that is x(r) < 2θ.





r − (rd − 1)2
2r
,
and the mass of the area R0
5 is µA. Hence the diﬀerence between the sum of
25the masses of regions R2, R3, R0
4 and R0
5 and the mass of region R1 is
2µBv2(r,2θ) + 2µAv3(r,2θ) + 2µBv
0
4(r,2θ) + µA − 2µBv1(r,2θ)
which, after substituting µB − µA by θ is equal to
D2(r,θ) =
r3(12θ2 − 48θ3 − 1) + r2(28θ2 + 4θ + 1 − 16θ3) + r(16θ2 + 1) − 4θ − 1
8r(r + 1)
.
Diﬀerentiating D2(r,θ) over r we can easily check that it is increasing with









(2θ + 1)3 > 0
for 1/(1 + 2θ) ≤ r ≤ 1/(1 − 2θ) and 0 < θ < 1/4. Hence x(r) ≤ 2θ in this
case.
Lastly, consider a line y = r(x + 2θ) and suppose that it intersects the
square according to conﬁguration (3) (see Figure 7). Then it holds that
1/(1−2θ) ≤ r ≤ 1/(2θ). We will show that the sum of the masses of regions
R2, R3, R0
4 and R0
5 is greater than the sum of the masses of regions R0
1 and
R6, which implies that the median line y = r(x + x(r)) must be to the right
of the line y = r(x + 2θ), that is x(r) < 2θ.
The areas of the new regions R0








(r(d − 1) + 1)2
2r(r − 1)
.
Hence the diﬀerence between the sum of the masses of regions R2, R3, R0
4
and R0
5 and the masses of regions region R0















Figure 7: Conﬁguration (3) with median line y = r(x + x(r)) intersecting the square.
which, after substituting µB − µA by θ is equal to
D3(r,θ) =
θ(4r2θ2(2r + 1 − r2) + r3 − r2 − r + 1)
r(r2 − 1)
.
It is easy to check that
r
3 − r
2 − r + 1 ≥ 0
for r ≥ 0 and
4r
2θ
2(2r + 1 − r
2) ≥ 0
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 +
√





2(2r + 1 − r
2) + r
3 − r
2 − r + 1 ≥ r(r − 1)
2 + 2 > 0,
as, θ ≥ 1/(2r). Thus we have shown that D3(r,θ) ≥ 0 for 0 < θ < 1/4 and
1/(1 − 2θ) ≤ r ≤ 1/(2θ) and so x(r) ≤ 2θ in this case.
27Now we are ready to show that (−2θ,−2θ) is a Nash equilibrium of game

















Observe that both the regions intersect the vertical median line. We
will show that for all r ∈ R \ {0} both regions intersect the median line
y = r(x + x(r)). Consider the region P((−c,−2θ),L1). Since all median
lines intersect the horizontal median line line within the interval (−2θ,0], so
for all r < 0 the median line y = r(x+x(r)) intersects this region. For r > 0
consider the line y = r(x+xp(r)) tangent to this region. Then xp(r) = 2θ−rc
and if we show that x(r) ≥ xp(r), for r > 0, then this will imply that the
associated median lines intersect the region. As we observed above, it must
be that x(r) ≥ 0, for r > 0. Thus if xp(r) ≤ 0, that is r ≥ 2θ/c, then the
inequality is satisﬁed. Suppose that r < 2θ/c. Then r ≤ 1/2, as c ≥ 4θ, and
we have to show that the inequality holds for conﬁguration (1), that is
xp(r) ≤
p
(1 − r2)(32r2θ2 + 1 − r2) − (1 − r2)
8r2θ


















(1 − r2 + 16r2θ2)2 − 256r4θ4 − (1 − r2 + 16r2θ2)
32r2θ2
28obtained from the right hand side of the inequality. Let
ψ(r,θ) =
p




Notice that ψ(r,θ) < 0 for 0 < r ≤ 1/2 and 0 < θ ≤ 1/4. Diﬀerentiating






(1 − r2)(r2(32θ2 − 1) + 1)
16r2θ3(r2(32θ2 − 1) + 1)
.




for 0 < r < 1/2 and 0 < θ ≤ 1/4. Thus ϕ(r,θ) is decreasing in θ for







1 − r4 − 1
2r2 , (5)
for 0 < r ≤ 1/2 and c ≥ 4θ. Since
√









> −r ≥ −r
c
4θ
for 0 < r ≤ 1/2 and c ≥ 4θ, so the inequality (4) holds. Thus we have shown
that all median lines intersect the region P((−c,−2θ),L1). Showing that all
median lines intersect the region P((c,−2θ),L2) can be done by symmetrical
arguments, due to the fact that f is symmetrical about the horizontal median
line. Hence if c ≥ 4θ, then (−2θ,−2θ) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ
i,i
c,−c.
To be complete, the next example demonstrates that an equilibrium may








Figure 8: Distribution function for Example 2.
Example 2 (Non-existence of a DFPE). Consider the distribution function
f which is a rotated distribution from Example 1 with support presented in
Figure 8.
Let the coordinates system be orientated so that the horizontal median
line is the horizontal axis (x) and the vertical median line is the vertical
axis (y). Consider a game Γ
i,i
c,−c with committed issue i of both candidates
being horizontal dimension and the values to which candidates 1 and 2 are
committed being c and −c, respectively. We prove the following claim:
Claim 2. If c 6= 0, then a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
c,−c does not exist,
that is there is no DFPE.
Proof. Like in Example 2, if 0 < r < 1/2, the median line r(x + x(r))
intersects the square according to conﬁguration (1) (see Figure 5). Consider
a line r(x + d) intersecting the square according to conﬁguration (1). Then
the mass on the left hand side of the line is
2µB + 2µA − 2µA(v2(r,d) + v5(r,d)) +2µB(v3(r,d) + v4(r,d)) +2µBv1(r,d)),
30where v1(r,d), v2(r,d), v3(r,d), v4(r,d) and v5(r,d) are areas of regions R1,
R2, R3, R4 and R5, respectively, as computed in Example 3 (see Equa-
tion (1)). After substituting µB − µA by θ this mass is equal to
2d2rθ(1 − 2r − r2) − dr(1 − r2) + (1 − r2)(2rθ + 1)
2(1 − r2)
Making this equal to 1/2 and solving for d we ﬁnd x(r), which is the
intersection point of the median line y = r(x+x(r)) with the horizontal axis
x(r) =
1 − r2 −
p
(1 − r2)((1 − r2)(1 − 16θ2) + 32rθ2)









for 0 < θ < 1/4. Hence it holds that ¯ p
+
0 = (−x0,0). Moreover, by symmetry
of the distribution about vertical median line, ¯ p
−
0 = (x0,0), and since x0 > 0
it holds that ¯ p
+
0 6= ¯ p
−
0 . Thus, by Theorem 3, there is no full participation
Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,i
c,−c if c > 0.
4.2.2. Heterogeneous commitment
Suppose that c1 6= c2 (and consequently n1 6= n2). To simplify the pre-
sentation, for any ¯ x = (x,y) ∈ R, we will assume that the ﬁrst coordinate is
the value of the committed issue candidate 1 or the free issue of candidate
2, while the second coordinate is the value of the free issue of candidate 1
or the committed issue of candidate 2. We will also use y1 and y0
1 to denote
values of free issue chosen by candidate 1 and x2 and x0
2 to denote values of
the free issue chosen by candidate 2.
In what follows we will refer to median lines mec1−ec2 and mec1+ec2, which
will be denoted by m+ and m−, respectively, to simplify the notation. The
31following lemma is itself interesting. It shows that for such an equilibrium
to exist, any one of exactly two symmetric cases must hold as far as the
committed values of each candidate is concerned:
Lemma 2. Consider the game Γ
i,j
a,b with i 6= j. If a DFPE exists, then either
(a,b) ∈ m+ or (a,b) ∈ m−.
Proof. Assume the opposite and let (y1,x2) be a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a,b. Let ¯ x1
and ¯ x2 denote the policies proposed by candidates 1 and 2 in equilibrium,
respectively. Since the equilibrium is divergent, so it must be that ¯ x1 6= ¯ x2.
Notice ﬁrst that it must be that y1 6= b and x2 6= a. For suppose the
opposite and assume that y1 = b. Since the equilibrium is divergent, so it
must be that x2 6= a. Moreover it must be that ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 are symmetric about
the median line mi. But then candidate 2 can reposition himself to x0
2 such
that (x0
2,b) ∈ L2 ∩ mi and win outright, which contradicts the assumption
that (y1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence it must be that y1 6= b. The case
of x2 6= a can be shown by analogical arguments.
For the remaining part let l+ denote the line parallel to m+ and such that
(a,b) ∈ l+ and let l− denote the line parallel to m− such that (a,b) ∈ l−.
Then either ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 lie on the opposite sides of l+ or l−. Suppose that the
ﬁrst case holds and suppose that δ(¯ x1,m+) < δ(¯ x2,m+) (where δ denotes the
distance between a point and a line). Then candidate 2 can reposition himself
to y0
1 such that B((a,y0
1), ¯ x2) = l+ and win outright. Similarly there would be
an improving deviation for candidate 2 if it was that δ(¯ x2,m+) < δ(¯ x1,m+).
Hence it must be that l+ = m+ and so (a,b) ∈ m+ in this case. It can be
shown, by analogical arguments, that it must be that l− = m− in the case
where ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 lie on the opposite sides of l−.
32From now on we will restrict our attention to the case where (a,b) ∈ m+.
Analogous results hold for the symmetric case where (a,b) ∈ m−.
It turns out that in any DFPE with heterogeneous commitment (and
with (a,b) ∈ m+), both candidates must propose the projection of the point
¯ p0(m+) on their respective free issues. Hence, for such equilibrium to exist,
the distribution f must be such that both ¯ p
+
0 (m+) and ¯ p
−
0 (m+) exist and
¯ p
+
0 (m+) = ¯ p
−
0 (m+) = ¯ p0(m+). Moreover the feasible sets of policies of both
candidates must be distant enough from the point ¯ p0(m+). From Lemma 2
and points (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 5 it will follow that in equilibrium, the
distance between the policies announced by the two parties must be signiﬁ-
cantly large.
Theorem 5. Consider a game Γ
i,j
a,b with i 6= j and suppose that (a,b) ∈ m+.
If a DFPE exists then
(i). ¯ p
+
0 (m+) = ¯ p
−
0 (m+) = ¯ p0(m+),
(ii). if a < ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i, then ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i − a ≥ Dl
f, where Dl
f ∈ R≥0 is a
threshold value that depends on the distribution f only,
(iii). if a > ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i, then a − ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i ≥ Dr
f, where Dr
f ∈ R≥0 is a
threshold value that depends on the distribution f only,
(iv). for any ε > 0 a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a−ε,b−ε (if a < ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i) or game
Γ
i,j
a+ε,b+ε (if a > ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i) exists.
Moreover, if a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a,b exists, then a strategy proﬁle (y1,x2)
is a DFPE if and only if y1 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ j and x2 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i.
Proof. We start by showing that if (y1,x2) is a DFPE, then it must be that








Figure 9: Conﬁguration with ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 not symmetric about median line m+ and possible
improving deviations (at least one of them improves).
symmetric about the median line m+. Assume that the opposite holds. Then
P(¯ x1,L2) ∩ P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅ and there exist two parallel lines l1 and l2, one
tangent to P(¯ x1,L2) and another one tangent to P(¯ x2,L1). Hence the median
line m parallel to l1 and l2 satisﬁes m∩P(¯ x1,L2) = ∅ or m∩P(¯ x2,L1) = ∅.
(see Figure 9).
But then, by Lemma 1, there exists an improving deviation for at least
one of the candidates, so (y1,x2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Hence it
must be that ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 are symmetric about the median line m+.
Next we show that if (y1,x2) is a DFPE, then it must be that y2 =
¯ p0(m+) ↓ j and x2 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i. Notice that if ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 are symmetric






Figure 10: Tangency of regions P(¯ x1,L2) and P(¯ x2,L1) when ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 are symmetric
about median line m+.
to each other and the tangency point ¯ x ∈ m+ (see Figure 10).
We will show that it must be that ¯ x = ¯ p
+
0 (m+) and ¯ x = ¯ p
−
0 (m+). We will
show the ﬁrst equality, the second one can be shown analogically. Arguments
here are similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that
¯ x 6= ¯ p
+
0 (m+). Since ¯ p
+
0 (m+) = limr→0+ γm+(r) and γm+ is continuous on
R \ {0}, so for any σ > 0 there exists rσ > 0 such that for all r0 ∈ [0,rσ),
|γm+(r0)−γm+(0)| < σ. Take σ = k¯ x− ¯ p
+
0 (m+)k/2 and let s be the gradient
of the line tangent to P(¯ x2,L1) at the projection of point (¯ x+ ¯ p
+
0 (m+))/2 on
P(¯ x2,L1) with respect to median line m+.
Then there exists r0 ∈ [0,rσ) such that r0 < s. For any such r0 the
associated median line [m]r0 does not intersect P(¯ x2,L1) (if ¯ p
+








Figure 11: Conﬁguration with ¯ p
+
0 (m+) > ¯ x and a median line lying outside region
P(¯ x2,L1).
or P(¯ x1,L2) (if ¯ p
+
0 (m+) < ¯ x) (see Figure 11). Hence, by Lemma 1, (y1,x2)
cannot be a Nash equilibrium of Γ
i,j
a,b, which contradicts our assumptions.
Thus it must be that ¯ x = ¯ p
+
0 (m+). We can show, using analogical arguments,
that it must also be that ¯ x = ¯ p
−
0 (m+). It follows that if a DFPE of Γ
i,j
a,b exists,
then it must be that ¯ p
+
0 (m+) = ¯ p
−
0 (m+) = ¯ p0(m+). Moreover it must be that
¯ p0(m+) = ¯ x, that is y1 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ j and x2 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i.
Before we continue with the proof, we make the following remark:
Remark 2. The analysis above implies that if a DFPE of Γ
i,j
a,b exists, then
it is unique and has the form (y1,x2), where y1 = ¯ p0(m+) ↓ j and x2 =
¯ p0(m+) ↓ i. Hence if such equilibrium exists, then a strategy proﬁle (y1,x2),


















In the next part of the proof we show that if a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a,b exists,
then, for any ε > 0, a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a−ε,b−ε (if a < ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i) or game
Γ
i,j
a+ε,b+ε (if a > ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i) exists.
Suppose that a < ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i (proof for a > ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i is analogical)
and let (y1,x2) be a DFPE of Γ
i,j
a,b. Let Lε
1 = {(a − ε,y) : y ∈ R} and
Lε
2 = {(x,b−ε) : x ∈ R}. Notice that for ε > 0 it holds that P((a,y1),L2) ⊆
P((a−ε,y1),Lε
2) and P((x2,b),L1) ⊆ P((x2,b−ε),Lε
1) (see Figure 12). Thus
any median line intersecting both P((a,y1),L2) and P((x2,b),L1) intersects
both P((a − ε,y1)),Lε
2) and P((x2,b − ε),Lε
1) as well.
Hence, by Lemma 1, (y1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,j
a−ε,b−ε. More-
37over, there exists a minimal distance Dl
f ≥ 0 between ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i and a such
that P((a,y1),L2)∪P((x2,b),L1) intersects all the median lines. Value of Dl
f
depends on the distribution f only as ¯ p0(m+) depends on the distribution f.
If a > ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i, then we can show analogical result for game Γ
i,j
a+ε,b+ε,
using similar arguments. Hence there exists a minimal distance Dr
f ≥ 0
between a and ¯ p0(m+) ↓ i such that P((a,y1),L2) ∪ P((x2,b),L1) intersects
all the median lines. Again, value of Dr
f depends on the distribution f
only.
As mentioned before, an analogical theorem holds for the symmetric case
where (a,b) ∈ m−.
Equilibria with a non-empty core. If the distribution function f has non-
empty core, then we are able to extend Theorem 5 to provide the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for existence of divergent full participation Nash
equilibrium and its full characterisation. The main feature of the following
theorem is that such a DFPE can be truly divergent, that is each candidate
can propose a unique policy in each issue. In particular, the chosen value of
the free issue by one candidate is the projection of the core on the opponent’s
committed issue.
Theorem 6. Consider a game Γ
i,j
a,b with i 6= j. If the distribution function
f has a non-empty core Cf = {¯ cf} then a DFPE exists if and only if either
(a,b) ∈ m+ or (a,b) ∈ m−. Moreover, (y1,x2) is a DFPE if and only if
y1 = ¯ cf ↓ j and x2 = ¯ cf ↓ i.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 that if a DFPE of game Γ
i,j
a,b exists, then
either (a,b) ∈ m+ or (a,b) ∈ m−.
38Suppose that (a,b) ∈ m+. If (y1,x2) is a DFPE then y1 = ¯ cf ↓ j and
x2 = ¯ cf ↓ i follows immediately from Theorem 5.
On the other hand we will show that a strategy proﬁle (y1,x2) such that
y1 = ¯ cf ↓ j and x2 = ¯ cf ↓ i is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ
i,j
a,b. Let ¯ x1 and ¯ x2
denote the policies proposed by the candidates 1 and 2, respectively, under
the strategy proﬁle (y1,x2). Notice that P(¯ x1,L2) and P(¯ x2,L1) intersect all
the median lines. Hence, by Lemma 1, no proﬁtable deviation from (y2,x1) is
possible by any candidate and so (y1,x2) is a Nash equilibrium. This shows
also that if (a,b) ∈ m+, then a DFPE of Γ
i,j
a,b exists.
If (a,b) ∈ m− then the theorem can be proved by similar arguments,
using the analogue of Theorem 5 for (a,b) ∈ m−.
Equilibrium with an empty core. As in the case of homogeneous commitment,
we are unable to give full conditions for existence of a DFPE and complete
characterisation of Nash equilibria if the core of f is empty. However we
provide the following example with an empty core distribution where a DFPE
exists.
Example 3 (Existence of equilibrium). Consider the distribution function f
presented in Figure 13, which support is a (closed) square with side of length
2. Moreover the square is divided into 8 parts of equal area. The density
function is constant on each of these areas (including the clockwise border,
and excluding the centre) and at the centre its value is the same as in areas
labelled with B. The mass of each area labelled with A is µA and the mass of
each area labelled with B is µB. Moreover µB > µA > 0 and µA +µB = 1/4.








Figure 13: Distribution function for Example 3.
masses (notice that 0 < θ < 1/4). Notice that the distribution is a rotated
distribution from Example 1 and so again the core is empty.
Let the coordinate system be re-orientated so that the horizontal (x) axis
is the horizontal axis of symmetry of the square and the vertical (y) axis is
the vertical axis of symmetry of the square. Notice that the lines y = x and
y = −x are median lines m+ and m−, respectively.
Since the distribution f is a rotated distribution from Example 1 so the
distance from the origin to the intersection point of m+ and a median line
[m+]r is given by the function x(r), as computed in Example 1. Hence x(r) ∈
[0,2θ), x(r) = x(−r) and for 0 < r ≤ 1/2, x(r) is given by equation (2).
Moreover it holds that ¯ p
−
0 (m+) = ¯ p
+





Consider a game Γ
i,j
−c,−c with the committed issue i of candidate 1 being
vertical dimension, the committed issue j of candidate 2 being horizontal di-
40mension and the values to which candidate 1 and 2 are committed being c
and −c, respectively. We prove the following:











































Both the regions intersect the median line m− and are tangent to each other




2θ) (see Figure 14).
We will show that for all r ∈ R \ {0} both these regions intersect the
median line [m+]r. Consider region P((
√
2θ,−c),L1). Since all median lines




2θ), so for all
r < 0 the median line [m+]r intersects the region. For r > 0 consider the line
tr parallel to [m+]r and tangent to the region P((
√
2θ,−c),L1) and let xp(r)
be the signed4 distance between the origin and the intersection point of tr
and m+. Then xp(r) = (2θ−
√
2rc)/(r+1) and if we show that x(r) ≥ xp(r),
for r > 0, then it will imply that associated median lines intersect the region.
As we observed above, it must be that x(r) ≥ 0, for r > 0. Thus if xp(r) ≤ 0,
4By the signed distance of a point from the origin we mean the distance between the
point and origin, if horizontal coordinates of the point are positive and minus the distance














that is r ≥
√
2θ/c, then the inequality is satisﬁed. Suppose that r <
√
2θ/c.
Then r ≤ 1/2, as c ≥ 2
√
2θ, and we have to show that
xp(r) ≤
p
(1 − r2)(32r2θ2 + 1 − r2) − (1 − r2)
8r2θ




≤ 2θ − 4rθ
for 0 < r ≤ 1/2 and 0 < θ ≤ 1/4 and, as we have shown in Example 1
2θ − 4rθ ≤
p
(1 − r2)(32r2θ2 + 1 − r2) − (1 − r2)
8r2θ
for 0 < r ≤ 1/2 and 0 < θ ≤ 1/4.
Thus we have shown that all median lines intersect the region P((
√
2θ,−c),L1).
Showing that all median lines intersect the region P((−c,
√
2θ),L2) can be
42done by symmetrical arguments, due to the fact that f is symmetrical about











Although the focus of this paper is on full participation Nash equilibria, or
in other words on two party equilibria, we would like to make some comments
on Nash equilibria where one of the players stays out of the competition. Like
in the case of full participation Nash equilibrium, the key to analysis of this
case is Lemma 1. Clearly if the game is such that none of the bisectors
of feasible sets of policies of the players is a median line, then one of the
players cannot have an unbeatable policy to propose. For a one party Nash
equilibrium to exist it is necessary that another player can propose a policy ¯ x
such that P(¯ x,L) intersects all the median lines (where L denotes the feasible
sets of policies of the opponent). Notice that if this condition is satisﬁed, then
it is possible that it is satisﬁed for other policies in the close neighbourhood
of ¯ x and so there can be more than one one-party equilibrium for such game.
As a passing remark, we would like to mention that in our model the only
class of equilibria which are robust to small perturbations to the distribution
of voters preferences is where a single party stands uncontested. This is
because full participation equilibria imply that the two parties are tied in
their vote support. However, this critique holds for all models with sincere
voting.
435. Discussion
Existence of full participation equilibrium depends on the existence of
some special point in the ideology space, identiﬁed in our analysis by p0. To
understand the role of the voters with ideal policy as p0, we ﬁrst recall the
deﬁnition of the constrained core from Beeler Asay (2008): the constrained
core of candidate i is simply the set of policies available to candidate i which
remain unbeatable by any policy available to candidate j in our restricted
voting scenario.
We have shown that when the set of voters is a continuum, the con-
strained cores of each candidate, if non-empty, contain unique policy points
– constrained core points. In our game, any full participation Nash equilib-
rium must involve each candidate proposing unbeatable strategies. Hence
such an equilibrium either does not exist (when the constrained core of some
candidate is empty) or policies proposed by the players in equilibrium are
their respective constrained core points. Point p0 is then the projection of
these constrained core points of each candidate. A voter at p0 is indiﬀer-
ent between the constrained core points of each candidate while he strictly
prefers a constrained core point of each player to any other policy of that
player. Hence, any voter at p0 enjoys the following decisive power: if he
weakly prefers the policy proposed by candidate 1 to any policy that is feasi-
ble to candidate 2, then 1 cannot be strictly beaten by 2, and the same holds
for candidate 2. Hence each candidate wants to secure the support of these
voters. In a one-dimensional competition with two competing candidates,
the median voter plays exactly this role. However, we would like to point
out that voters on the bisecting median line in our model are not in this
44sense median voters. To see this, pick an arbitrary median line m and two
arbitrary policy choices of the candidates. Suppose some voter i with ideal
policy on m strictly prefers the policy proposed by candidate 1 to any other
policy proposed by candidate 2. If voter i is not located at p0, then the policy
of candidate 1 cannot be 1’s constrained core point and hence candidate 2
can defeat this policy.
Given this discussion we would like to identify voters with ideal policy p0
as strict median voters. Of course there may be distributions where there is no
strict median voter and in every such situation a divergent full-participation
equilibrium will not exist. In case of homogeneous commitment, the strict
median, if it exists is always unique. This is true for the heterogeneous case
as well, barring a very special case: one where L1, L2, m+ and m− have a
common intersection and we have a pair of strict medians (notice that in
this case the projections of strict medians on Li will coincide for one of the
candidates i).
Although we know that even if core of the distribution is non-empty, then
for any median line m point p0(m) may still exist, we are unable to obtain any
properties of the distribution that would guarantee its existence in general.
First of all it is unclear what properties of the distribution guarantee that
points p
+
0 (m) and p
−
0 (m) coincide. We conjecture that a suﬃcient condition
for this to happen is continuity of the density function at almost every point
of m. However we are unable to prove this result. Second, and a more
primitive problem is existence of these limit points, that is what properties
of the distribution guarantee that p
+
0 (m) ∈ R2 and p
−
0 (m) ∈ R2.
We would like to note that existence of point p0(m), where m is a median
45line which is a bisector of feasible sets of policies of the candidates is still
not suﬃcient for guaranteeing existence of a DFPE. Another problem is the
behaviour of median lines [m]r in the neighbourhood of r = 0. The question
is whether it is always possible to have parabolic regions of ideal positions of
loyal voters of the candidates large enough to “capture” all the median lines.
Despite the problems mentioned above it is still possible to have distri-
butions with empty core for which a DFPE exist, even in the heterogeneous
settings, as presented in Examples 1 and 3.
Our results show that in case of Downsian competition with unidimen-
sional commitment some sort of convergence is still in place. In case of a
CFPE, this leads either to the median voter theorem and convergence to the
median point (in homogeneous setting) of the free issue or convergence to the
policy in the union of the candidates’ feasible sets of policies which is weakly
majority preferred to all other policies in the union of these sets. In case of
a DFPE, the policies proposed by the candidates in equilibrium converge to
the projection of the point p0(m) on their respective feasible sets of policies.
Point p0(m) belongs to the set of points equidistant from the feasible sets of
policies of both candidates (a bisector of these sets) m. Moreover m must
be a median line. Despite this convergence the policies proposed in equi-
librium by both candidates are indeed diﬀerent, even in the heterogeneous
settings, where feasible sets of policies of both candidates have non-empty
intersection.
466. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied Downsian competition in a two dimensional
ideology space between two candidates whose sets of feasible policies are re-
stricted by unidimensional commitment. We have shown that this kind of
restriction allows for existence of Nash equilibria under larger class of distri-
butions than in the case of unrestricted competition. Moreover we provided
necessary conditions for existence of Nash equilibria where both candidates
enter the competition. We gave necessary and suﬃcient conditions together
with full characterisation in the case of convergent Nash equilibria (where
both candidates propose the same policy in equilibrium) as well as in the
case of divergent Nash equilibria under distributions with non-empty core.
For distributions with empty core, we have given necessary conditions for
the existence of such equilibria, linking their existence with the existence of
the strict median that depends only on the distribution. Moreover, we pro-
vided examples showing situations where divergent Nash equilibria exist even
though the distribution has an empty core. Interestingly, it is possible to have
such equilibria even in the case where feasible sets of policies of both can-
didates have non-empty intersection. Two interesting features of divergent
equilibria with two parties are: (a) when the two share the same committed
issue, they tend to have extreme opposite stands on that issue while agreeing
completely on the free issue while (b) when the committed issues are diﬀerent
for diﬀerent parties, their ﬁnal positions in the two-dimensional space tend to
be signiﬁcantly far apart from each other and truly divergent in every issue.
We are so far unable to provide properties of the distribution function that
would guarantee existence of the strict median that is closely related to the
47existence of divergent Nash equilibria and the interesting research question
is whether the strict median exists for large enough class of distributions.
Another interesting direction of research is to check whether the results
obtained here would extend to more than two dimensions. More precisely,
what would the eﬀect of unidimensional commitment be when the ideology
space has three or more dimensions. It seems that the regions containing ideal
points of loyal voters of the candidates would be multidimensional parabolic
quadratic curves and that existence of divergent Nash equilibria would de-
pend on the existence of the strict median in d − 1-dimensional hyperspace
being a bisector of hyperspaces of feasible polices of the candidates. It seems
also that existence of divergent Nash equilibria in this setting will remain
closely related to existence of the strict median in the bisector of candidates’
feasible sets of policies, like in two dimensional case.
We did not address the issue of more than two candidates competing in
the elections or a setting with endogenous entry. These extensions are yet
another interesting direction to explore.
Appendix
Proof of Fact 1. Take any ~ v ∈ R2 and let l = span{~ v} be the line spanned
on this vector. Since f is non-atomic, so the distribution f projected on l,
fl is non-atomic as well and has unique median. Let ¯ x be the median of fl.
Then the line l⊥(¯ x) is a median line of f and is perpendicular to ~ v, that is
l⊥(¯ x) = m
f
~ v.
Proof of Fact 2. Notice that since f is non-atomic, then, by Fact 1, for any
vector ~ v ∈ R2 there exists a unique median line m
f
~ v. Hence there exists a
48unique intersection point of all median lines from Mf.
For the left to right implication suppose that Cf 6= ∅ and let ¯ x ∈ Cf. We
will show that for all m ∈ Mf it must hold that ¯ x ∈ m. For assume the
opposite and let m ∈ Mf be such that ¯ x / ∈ m. Let ¯ z be the projection of
¯ x on m. Then ¯ zM¯ x, which contradict the assumption that ¯ x ∈ Cf. Thus it
must be that for any ¯ x ∈ Cf and for all m ∈ Mf it holds that ¯ x ∈ m. Hence
Cf = {¯ cf}, where ¯ cf is the intersection point of all median lines.
For the right to left implication we will show that if ¯ cf is the intersection
point of all median lines, then for all ¯ x ∈ R2, ¯ cf ¯ M¯ x, that is ¯ cf ∈ Cf. Assume
the opposite and let ¯ x ∈ R2 be such that ¯ xM¯ cf. But this is impossible as
m ∈ D(¯ cf, ¯ x), where m is the median line parallel to the bisector B(¯ cf, ¯ x) of
¯ cf and ¯ x, and so µ(D(¯ cf, ¯ x)) > 1/2 > µ(D(¯ x,¯ cf)). Hence it must be that
¯ cf ¯ M¯ x, for all ¯ x ∈ R2, and consequently ¯ cf ∈ Cf.
Proof of Fact 3. Take any m ∈ Mf and any r ∈ R\{0}. Let ¯ x = γm(r) and
let ls(¯ x) be the line intersecting m at ¯ x and such that the gradient of it with
respect to m is s. Let βm
¯ x (s) be the diﬀerence between the mass of the right
half plane and the mass of the left half plane deﬁned by ls(¯ x). Then βm
¯ x is a
continuous function of s.
Let αm
¯ x,s(d) be the mass of the region between the line ls(¯ x) and the line
ls(¯ z), where ¯ z ∈ m is a point to the right of ¯ x and such that δ(¯ x, ¯ z) = d, if
d ≥ 0, or a point to the left of ¯ x and such that δ(¯ x, ¯ z) = −d, if d < 0. Notice
that αm
¯ x,s is continuous and, since f is non-atomic, it is strictly increasing
with d increasing, for any s. Thus its reverse function (αm
¯ x,s)−1 is well deﬁned
and continuous for any s.
Observe that δ(¯ x,γm(s)) = |(αm
¯ x,s)−1(βm
¯ x(s))|. Notice that since r 6= 0, so
49lims→r(αm
¯ x,s)−1(t) = (αm
¯ x,r)−1(t), for all t. It also holds that lims→r βm
¯ x (s) = 0.
Hence lims→r |(αm
¯ x,s)−1(βm
¯ x (s))| = 0 and so lims→r γm(s) = γm(r). Hence γm
is continuous on R \ {0}.
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